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SOCIO-POLITICAL CLIMATE BEFORE 
ELECTIONS 2006 
Between April 13 and 25, 2004, the Insti-
tute for Public Affairs conducted a sur-
vey that mapped the social and political 
climate in Slovakia before the upcoming 
2006 parliamentary elections as well as 
basic patterns of electoral behaviour.  
 
How does the public perceive the direction in 
which the Slovak society is heading? 
 
Is the Slovak society heading in the right or 
wrong direction? This key evaluation ques-
tion that examines past developments but 
simultaneously anticipates future ones, split 
respondents almost evenly, as 46% of them 
answered positively and 50% negatively 
(please see Graph 1). This ratio of views 
should not be taken for granted. Compared 
to previous two parliamentary elections, 
citizens perception continues to improve; 
before the 1998 parliamentary elections, the 
ratio of positive and negative responses was 
 
The data were gathered by the FOCUS 
agency through its network of trained 
interviewers from a representative sam-
ple of 1,242 Slovak citizens older than 
18, using the method of face-to-face in-
terviews.  
 
The survey was supported by the Open 
Society Foundation. 
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Graph 1: Do you believe that the Slovak society is heading in the right or in the wrong direction?
20%:69% while four years later it was 
28%:64%.  
 
Citizens opinions regarding the overall di-
rection of Slovakias development are sig-
nificantly determined by their social pro-
file. Particularly satisfied are people with 
higher education; people with qualified 
jobs; younger people; people who do not 
suffer from material shortage; finally, peo-
ple who identify themselves as members of 
the higher middle or even the middle class. 
positively view Slovakias development di-
rection. Even more such respondents (32%) 
sympathize with hardcore opposition par-
ties (i.e. SNS, Smer-DS, KSS, and ĽS-
HZDS). The remainder comprises voters of 
other parties, undecided voters and non-
voters. 
 
When taking a look from the reversed per-
spective, we see that Slovakias overall de-
velopment is viewed positively by most sup-
porters of the SDKÚ-DS (88%), KDH (68%), 1822
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Graph 2: Do you think that the Slovak society is heading in the right or wrong direction? 
(breakdown by political parties supporters)
Positive perception of Slovakias general 
development is closely interconnected to 
unambiguous endorsement of Slovakias EU 
membership.  
 
The category of respondents with positive 
views of the countrys overall development 
lis much more numerous than the cate-
gory of those who trust the incumbent Mi-
kulá Dzurinda administration (for quite a 
long time, their total share has been lower 
than 25%) or those who favourably evaluate 
its performance (of all respondents who said 
they were satisfied with Slovakias overall 
development, one in four would mark the 
government with an A or B, almost one in 
two would award it with a C while one in 
three would use a D or E). 
 
Satisfaction with Slovakias overall devel-
opment is not an exclusive feature of the 
outgoing ruling coalitions supporters, as 
SDKÚ-DS, SMK and KDH voters make up 
less than one third (31%) of all people who 
SF (60%) and SMK (55%). On the other 
hand, most sympathizers of Smer-SD and 
SNS (56% each), ĽS-HZDS (64%) and KSS 
(80%) presented opposite views (please see 
Graph 2). 
 
 
How do citizens perceive reforms currently 
underway?  
 
As we observed toward the end of 2005, 
most ongoing reforms  except the health 
service reform  do not provoke funda-
mental refusal and opposition on the part 
of citizens (please see Table 1).  
 
Since November 2005, citizens perception 
of ongoing reforms has not changed almost 
at all. Again, the most positively evaluated 
was decentralization of public administra-
tion as 61 % of respondents said it was basi-
cally good (50%) or did not have any reser-
vations (11%). Majority of respondents also 
endorsed taxation (58%) and pension (53%) 
 2
reforms, while changes in welfare benefits 
were supported by almost one in two re-
spondents (47%). As we see, none of the ex-
amined reforms is endorsed without reser-
vations; citizens tend to support their basic 
philosophy while suggesting adjustments. 
The only reform opposed by a vast majority 
of citizens is the health service reform that 
should be thoroughly revised according to 
three in four respondents (72%). The re-
forms negative perception was reiterated by 
the list of the most pressing social problems 
where quality of provided health care 
ranked second overall as almost one in 
three respondents (31%) cited it among 
three most pressing problems. 
 
Compared to December 2005, there have 
been some faint but significant shifts in re-
forms perception by particular political 
parties supporters. Their greatest advocates 
continue to be SDKÚ-DS supporters, fol-
lowed by SF sympathizers (please see Table 
2). On the other hand, potential voters of 
KDH and partly SMK show a more critical 
attitude to reforms and emphasize the im-
portance of adjusting them. Supporters of 
Smer-SD have grown slightly more critical 
of most reforms, which brought them more 
in line with the critical rhetoric presented 
by Smer-SD Chairman Robert Fico.  
 
Based on their supporters prevailing atti-
tudes to examined reforms, political parties 
may be divided into three basic categories: 
A  parties whose supporters show above-
average support for all examined reforms 
(SDKÚ-DS and SF); B  parties whose sym-
pathizers show above-average criticism re-
garding all examined reforms (KSS, ĽS-
HZDS and Smer-SD); C  parties whose ad-
herents present rather average or inconsis-
tent attitudes (for instance the KDH that 
inclines to category A or the SMK and SNS 
that incline to category B).  
 
 
Which problems are viewed as the most 
pressing by citizens? 
 
The respondents were asked to select the 
most pressing social problems (please see 
Table 3) from a list. The most frequently 
identified problems included unemploy-
ment (50%), quality of health care (31%), 
poverty (29%) and the standard of living 
(27%). The second group comprised the 
following problems: status and opportuni-
Table 1: Citizens views regarding the future fate of reforms 
  
Good reform, it 
should be left 
as it is 
Basically a good  
reform, but it should 
be adjusted in details 
Bad reform, it 
should be changed  
thoroughly 
I dont 
know 
Decentralization of public administration  11 50 26 14 
Taxation reform  12 46 31 11 
Pension reform 7    46 37 10 
Changes in welfare benefits  7 40 46 7 
Health service reform 3 22 72 3 
Table 2: Citizens views regarding particular reforms - breakdown by political parties 
(good reform : good reform that needs adjustment : bad reform) 
  Taxation 
reform 
Pension 
reform Decentralization 
Changes in  
welfare benefits 
Health service 
reform 
SDKÚ 31 : 52 : 12 16 : 63 : 15 19 : 59 : 15 16 : 52 : 23 9 : 37 : 51 
SF 12 : 61 : 24 10 : 55 : 32 14 : 58 : 20 3 : 58 : 43 3 : 34 : 61 
KDH 12 : 47 : 29 11 : 54 : 29 7 : 48 : 29 8 : 41 : 44 5 : 27 : 67 
SMK 12 : 51 : 14 8 : 41 : 46 17 : 47 : 33 12 : 32 : 48 3 : 18 : 77 
SNS 16 : 46 : 34 6 : 41 : 46 17 : 47 : 33 12 : 32 : 48 4 : 18 : 77 
Smer-SD 10 : 43 : 42 7 : 46 : 42 8 : 47 : 34 6 : 38 : 51 3 : 15 : 81 
ĽS-HZDS 5 : 42 : 43 5 : 34 : 57 3 : 50 : 35 1 : 39 : 54 3 :15 : 80 
KSS 9 : 35 : 46 5 : 41 : 50 7 : 37 : 43 2 : 38 : 60 0 : 13 : 85 
Slovakia average  12 : 46 : 31 7 : 46 : 37 11 : 50 : 26 7 : 40 : 46 3 : 22 : 72 
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Table 3: Most pressing social problems 
Unemployment  50 
Quality of health care  31 
Poverty in Slovakia  29 
Living standard of people like you 27 
Status and opportunities of young people  17 
Prevalence of corruption and bribery  16 
Criminality, organized crime 15 
Economic and social disparities between regions 14 
Abuse of power  14 
Performance of the judiciary, enforceability of law and justice  9 
Status and opportunities of elderly people 9 
Performance of national economy  7 
Protection of rights of private firms employees  5 
Environmental protection  5 
Status and opportunities of women  4 
Quality of democracy in Slovakia  4 
Note: This was an open question, respondents could name three problems. 
ties of young people (17%), prevalence of 
corruption and bribery (16%), criminality 
and organized crime (15%), economic and 
social disparities between regions (14%) and 
abuse of power (14%). All these problems 
were cited by over 10% of respondents. 
Other problems were chosen by more than 
4% of respondents: status and opportunities 
of elderly people (9%); performance of the 
judiciary, enforceability of law and justice 
(9%); performance of national economy 
(7%); protection of rights of private firms 
employees (5%) and environmental 
protection (5%); status and opportunities of 
women (4%); quality of democracy in Slova-
kia (4%).  
 
What are the differences in perception of 
pressing social problems between particu-
lar parties supporters? As Table 4 shows, 
all relevant parties supporters labelled un-
employment as the most pressing problem. 
The closest to the Slovakia average are 
KDH, Smer-SD and SNS supporters whose 
lists of nine most pressing problems are 
identical with the one identified by the en-
tire population; furthermore, the rank of 
the problems did not essentially differ from 
Unemploymen
Quality of hea
Poverty in Slo
Living standar
Status and op
Prevalence of
 Criminality, o
Economic and
Abuse of powTable 4: The most pressing social problems as ranked by the Slovak population  
and political parties supporters 
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the overall list. Sympathizers of the SDKÚ-
DS are less worried about abuse of power 
and their own standard of living; instead, 
they emphasized the need to eliminate re-
gional disparities, improve effectiveness of 
the judiciary and law enforcement and en-
hance performance of national economy. 
Supporters of the SMK also stressed the 
importance of eliminating regional dispari-
ties. Potential voters of the SF are more sen-
sitive to issues of criminality and organized 
crime, corruption and bribery and abuse of 
power; on the other hand, they are not as 
much worried by the quality of health care. 
Supporters of ĽS-HZDS and KSS pay close 
attention to problems of elderly people but 
do not care much about the status and op-
portunities of young people or the preva-
lence of corruption and bribery; on top of 
that, potential voters of the ĽS-HZDS attach 
less importance to abuse of power. 
 
 
VOTER SUPPORT FOR PARTICULAR 
POLITICAL PARTIES AND PROFILES OF 
THEIR SUPPORTERS  
 
In mid-May 2006, i.e. approximately one 
months before parliamentary elections, the 
strongest party in terms of voting prefer-
ences was Smer-SD, which would receive 
over 30% of the popular vote according to 
surveys carried out by FOCUS agency but 
also other agencies. After a significant gap, 
Smer-SD is followed by the ĽS-HZDS 
(11.3%) and three parties of the outgoing 
ruling coalition, namely the SMK (10.0%), 
SDKÚ-DS (9.8%) and KDH (8.7%). Voter 
support for the SNS, which is currently out-
side parliament, hovers at approximately 
the same level (9.6%). If parliamentary elec-
tions were held in mid-April 2006, parlia-
mentary seats would be clinched also by the 
SF (6.8%) and the KSS (6.3%).  
 
One in nine eligible voters (11%) has not yet 
decided and/or refused to state any prefer-
ences. This category of voters is dominated 
by first-time voters (18% of all undecided 
voters), former non-voters (18%) and for-
mer SDKÚ-DS voters from 2002 (10%).  
 
Since the most recent parliamentary elec-
tions in 2002, voter support for particular 
political parties has seen some interesting 
developments. While the current opposition 
leader (i.e. Smer-SD) boosted its electoral 
potential from 13% to over 30%, prefer-
ences of the previous opposition leader (i.e. 
HZDS) dropped from 19.5% to 11%. Voter 
support for once ruling party, namely the 
ANO, has plunged below the 5% threshold. 
Parties that can boast with relatively stable 
the SMK, KDH and also the SKDÚ-DS that 
has managed to bounce back following a 
temporary crisis in summer 2003.  
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Graphs 4-11: Development of relevant political parties voting preferences since the 2002 parliamentary 
elections 
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In terms of socio-demographic structure, 
political parties electorates show the fol-
lowing long-term characteristics: 
• the typical supporter of the ĽS-HZDS 
and KSS is an elderly and less affluent 
resident of a smaller village; 
 
• the SMK remains primarily the party of 
ethnic Hungarians who make up 91% of 
its electorate; 
• the SDKÚ-DS is a party with above-
average support among urban (34% live 
in towns with population over 50,000) 
and educated voters (22% have com-
pleted university education) with a 
higher social status (72% perceive them-
selves as members of the higher middle 
class or the middle class while the na-
tional average is 60%); consequently, 
they are more affluent than the average 
Slovak voter; 
• the KDH electorate features the highest 
share of deeply believing people  75% 
compared to 11% in the entire adult 
population;  
• the greatest strongholds of the SNS are 
Banská Bystrica and ilina regions.  
 
From the viewpoint of voters self-
perception on the left-right continuum, we 
may draw a conclusion that  like in autumn 
2005  most Slovak voters perceive them-
selves as centre-oriented. Despite amplified 
• the electorate of Smer-SD closely copies 
the average Slovak voter in terms of vir-
tually all socio-demographic catego-
ries/characteristics;  
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Graph 12: Self-perception of political parties supporters on the left-right continuum
intensity of disputes over ongoing socio-
economic reforms, the total share of voters 
who declare centrist orientation slightly in-
creased from 41% to 46% (please see Graph 
12). The centrist orientation is the most fre-
quent among supporters of Smer-SD (47%). 
The overall proportion of people declaring 
leftist orientation and ambiguous attitudes 
saw a slight decline; two in three (66%) KSS 
adherents and two in five (39%) Smer-SD 
supporters declared leftist orientation. On 
the other hand, the rightist self-perception 
of SDKÚ-DS and KDH sympathizers has 
strengthened compared to November 2005.  
Besides objective reasons for not taking part 
in the upcoming elections (e.g. travelling 
abroad, health problems, etc.), our respon-
dents cited a variety of subjective reasons 
that may be divided into three basic cate-
gories:  
• Lack of trust in politicians (who 
mind only their own interests) and 
political parties (e.g. I dont trust any 
party All of them just promise 
Because all they do is lying Its al-
ways the same people trying to seize 
power using unfair methods); 
 • Feeling of helplessness and futility 
(e.g. Nothing will change anyway! 
It will be pointless anyway My vote 
cannot make a difference);  
 
Voter participation 
 
Several surveys indicate that total voter par-
ticipation in the upcoming parliamentary 
elections may well be lower than in 2002. 
According to a detailed seven-degree scale 
of position on participating, two in three 
(64%) respondents declared that they will 
likely come to the polls (21% will take part 
certainly, 14% almost certainly and 29% 
probably). On the other hand, almost one in 
four (22%) respondents representing eligi-
ble voters stated that they will probably not 
participate. At this point, almost one in 
eight eligible voters (12%) have not yet 
made up their minds about participating.  
• Cognitive disorientation, absence of 
viable alternatives (I cannot make up 
my mind because every political party 
claims something else I have never 
experienced a chaos like in our current 
politics).  
 
All in all, the reasons cited by potential non-
voters are a blend of frustration and apathy 
brought about by cognitive disorientation 
and alienation from politics.  
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Graph 13:
 Table 5: Slovakia is to hold parliamentary elections on June 17, 2006.  
What is your current position on participating? 
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We asked the respondents to describe them-
selves from the viewpoint of stability of vot-
ing pattern and timing of voting decision. 
More than two in five of them (42%) who 
had taken part in more than one elections 
in the past said they tend to change their 
preference from one elections to another. 
Again, we were able to establish substantial 
differences between individual parties elec-
torates. The SMK, ĽS-HZDS and KDH can 
rely on particularly loyal electorates. SDKÚ-
DS and KSS sympathizers also declared 
relatively high stability of their voting pat-
terns. On the other hand, Smer-SD and SF 
supporters admitted their voting pattern 
was rather unstable. About one in four re-
spondents said they tend to make up their 
mind in the last moment. 6.7
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All these findings indicate a high rate of 
uncertainty as far as election results go.  
 
 
What are the mutual sympathies and  
antipathies between particular parties  
supporters? 
 
Smer-SD and the SF are on top of the credi-
bility list of political parties. In fact, they are 
the only relevant parties that are trusted 
rather than distrusted. As for all other 
other relevant parties, distrust of citizens 
prevails over trust (please see Graph 14). 
 
We may also take a look at political parties 
credibility through the eyes of other parties 
supporters. Mutual closeness or distance 
between parties measured by the rate of 
their supporters trust or distrust in other 
parties allows us to draw a specific map of 
Slovakias political scene (please see Graphs 
15  23). -72
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Graph 14: General trust/distrust in political 
ti
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Graphs 15  23: Potential voters degree of trust/distrust in other political parties  
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Distance from other parties • KDH sympathizers excluded espe-
cially the KSS, ANO and ĽS-HZDS 
and were less reluctant regarding 
Smer-SD and the SNS; 
 
Based on the highest rate of distrust 
(please see Graphs 15  23), we may con-
clude the following regarding the distance 
between particular parties electorates:  
• potential voters of the SMK clearly 
excluded their partys future coop-
eration with the SNS, KSS and ĽS-
HZDS but were far less negative 
about Smer-SD; 
• supporters of the SDKÚ-DS and 
KDH distrust especially the KSS; 
• KSS, ĽS-HZDS and Smer-SD sympa-
thizers distance themselves espe-
cially from the SDKÚ-DS;  
• Smer-SD and KSS supporters most 
frequently excluded parties of the 
outgoing ruling coalition, particu-
larly the SDKÚ-DS; • SF supporters distance themselves 
especially from the ĽS-HZDS;  
• ĽS-HZDS sympathizers were more 
negative about the KDH and SMK 
than about the SDKÚ-DS; 
• SMK and SNS supporters show a 
high rate of mutual distrust. 
Among undecided voters and especially 
non-voters distrust prevails over trust with 
respect to all relevant political parties. 
• potential voters of the SF named the 
KSS, ĽS-HZDS and SDKÚ-DS as the 
least acceptable while being more 
open to their partys cooperation 
with Smer-SD; 
 
 
Least likely coalition bonds according  
• SNS supporters excluded especially 
the SMK, followed by the SDKÚ-DS 
and KSS but were not as negative 
with respect to the KDH. 
to parties supporters 
 
Potential coalition cooperation after elec-
tions is the acid test of mutual closeness and 
distance between political parties. Therefore 
we asked our respondents to identify their 
favourite parties least likely coalition ally 
(please see Table 6). Their responses al-
lowed us to make the following conclusions: 
 
Credibility of politicians  
 
In the long term, the credibility list of Slo-
vak politicians is led by Smer-SD Chairman 
Robert Fico. In an IVO survey from April 
2006, almost one in three respondents 
(31%) indicated him as trustworthy (please 
see Graph 24). Fico was followed by SF 
leader Zuzana Martináková (15%) and 
President Ivan Gaparovič (13%). Several 
• SDKÚ-DS supporters were the most 
negative about the KSS; also, they 
were more negative of their partys 
future cooperation with the Smer-SD 
than ĽS-HZDS; 
Suppo
SDKÚ
KDH 
SMK 
Smer-
ĽS-HZ
KSS 
SF 
SNS Table 6: In your opinion, which party is the least likely coalition ally of your favourite party? 
Least likely coalition allies 
First Second Third rters of: 
Party % Party % Party % 
-DS KSS 72 Smer-SD 52 ĽS-HZDS 32 
KSS 67 ANO 38 ĽS-HZDS 34 
SNS 75 ĽS-HZDS 50 KSS 48 
SD SDKÚ-DS 57 KDH 44 SMK 37 
DS KDH 48 SMK 40 SDKÚ-DS 38 
SDKÚ-DS 62 KDH 47 SMK 36 
KSS 46 SDKÚ-DS 42 ĽS-HZDS 27 
SMK 81 SDKÚ-DS 36 KSS 35  13
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Graph 24: Credibility of select political figures
  
Note: This was an open question. Respondents could name three politicians. 
party leaders strengthened their positions 
compared to November 2005, especially 
Vladimír Mečiar and Ján Slota but also Mi-
kulá Dzurinda; on the other hand, the po-
sition of President Gaparovič slightly weak-
ened.  
 
Politicians credibility can also be measured 
through their popularity among their own 
parties supporters. As Table 7 shows, party 
leaders are natural leaders within all rele-
vant political parties electorates. The most 
trustworthy party leaders are Vladimír Me-
čiar and Robert Fico whose credibility rate 
hovers at approximately 90% followed by 
Zuzana Martináková and Béla Bugár (79% 
and 78 %, respectively). Compared to No-
vember 2005, KSS and SNS chairmen Jozef 
evc and Ján Slota strengthened their posi-
tions along with Ivan Miklo (SDKÚ-DS), 
Daniel Lipic (KDH) and Róbert Kaliňák 
(Smer-SD), all second-seeded on their re-
spective parties tickets.  
 
The overall share of people who do not 
trust any politician has declined before the 
upcoming elections as voters tend to iden-
tify with their favourite parties leaders.  
 
 
*** 
 
 
 
Table 7: Credibility of politicians within particular political parties electorates 
Electorate/ 
politician 
Rating 
(%) 
Electorate/ 
Politician 
Rating 
(%) 
Electorate/ 
politician 
Rating 
(%) 
Electorate/ 
politician 
Rating 
(%) 
SDKÚ SMK KDH SF 
Dzurinda  62 Bugár 78 Hruovský 62 Martináková 79 
Miklo 46 Csáky 30 Lipic 47 Fico 34 
Bugár 20 Dzurinda 13 Palko 22 Gaparovič 18 
Smer HZDS KSS SNS 
Fico 90 Mečiar 89 evc 47 Slota 67 
Martináková 23 Veteka 26 Fico 38 Fico  
Kaliňák   20 Gaparovič 21 Nobody 21 Gaparovič 19 
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